La gouvernance régionale du transport ferroviaire de voyageurs en France : une approche par la méthode des comptes de surplus
Ten years ago, the SRU law initiated an ambivalent reform of the railway system of passenger transport in France. It preserves the monopoly of operation of the historical operator, but transfers the political responsibility for organizing the regional railway system to the regions. The economic theory suggests that the monopoly led to a revenue capture. With the surplus accounts method, which will be displayed on the SNCF-TER billing account, we can show that, on this initial stage, the Infrastructure Manager (RFF) has been the main beneficiary of the total available surplus, far ahead from the passenger who might benefit from the rail regionalization. The effect on local communities is more equivocal. If the regions have been able to control the border price of the operating subsidy, tolls excepted, they had to yield significant benefits for the rolling stock modernization. A more detailed approach shows how each region is a particular ?TER economic model? ruled by a specific mode of governance.
Volume (Year): février (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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