IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cai/recosp/reco_693_0407.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Généralisation de la complémentaire santé d’entreprise. Une évaluation ex ante des gains et des pertes de bien-être

Author

Listed:
  • Aurélie Pierre
  • Florence Jusot
  • Denis Raynaud
  • Carine Franc

Abstract

The ANI reform mandates all private sector employers to offer sponsored Complementary Health Insurance (CHI) to all of their employees beginning on January?1st, 2016.?This research simulates the likely effects of this mandate on the welfare of the population considering the Expected utility theory framework.?The results show that the ANI reform may induce an increase in social welfare only if wages and CHI?s premiums remain the same.?Assuming that premiums of individual CHI contracts increase because of the new risks segmentation, the reform may hardly impact the social welfare.?The gain in welfare that benefit private sector employees is therefore offset by the loss of welfare that suffer the individuals insured by an individual CHI contract or who chose to be uninsured before the reform.?Considering in addition that employers will include their subsidy amount into wages, the reform may greatly reduce the social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Aurélie Pierre & Florence Jusot & Denis Raynaud & Carine Franc, 2018. "Généralisation de la complémentaire santé d’entreprise. Une évaluation ex ante des gains et des pertes de bien-être," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 69(3), pages 407-441.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_693_0407
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_693_0407
    Download Restriction: free

    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2018-3-page-407.htm
    Download Restriction: free

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fleurbaey, Marc, 2012. "Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199653591.
    2. Pierre, Aurélie & Jusot, Florence, 2017. "The likely effects of employer-mandated complementary health insurance on health coverage in France," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 321-328.
    3. Thomas C. Buchmueller & Agnès Couffinhal & Michel Grignon & Marc Perronnin, 2004. "Access to physician services: does supplemental insurance matter? Evidence from France," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(7), pages 669-687.
    4. Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio & Serrano, Roberto, 2006. "Rejecting small gambles under expected utility," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 250-259, May.
    5. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
    6. Thomas C. Buchmueller & John DiNardo & Robert G. Valletta, 2011. "The Effect of an Employer Health Insurance Mandate on Health Insurance Coverage and the Demand for Labor: Evidence from Hawaii," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 25-51, November.
    7. Gruber, Jonathan, 2000. "Health insurance and the labor market," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 645-706, Elsevier.
    8. Fleurbaey, Marc & Blanchet, Didier, 2013. "Beyond GDP: Measuring Welfare and Assessing Sustainability," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199767199.
    9. Gary V. Engelhardt & Jonathan Gruber, 2010. "Medicare Part D and the Financial Protection of the Elderly," NBER Working Papers 16155, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Anne‐Laure Samson & Erik Schokkaert & Clémence Thébaut & Brigitte Dormont & Marc Fleurbaey & Stéphane Luchini & Carine Van de Voorde, 2018. "Fairness in cost‐benefit analysis: A methodology for health technology assessment," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(1), pages 102-114, January.
    11. Robert B. Barsky & F. Thomas Juster & Miles S. Kimball & Matthew D. Shapiro, 1997. "Preference Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach in the Health and Retirement Study," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(2), pages 537-579.
    12. Charles Blackorby & David Donaldson, 1990. "A Review Article: The Case against the Use of the Sum of Compensating Variations in Cost-Benefit Analysis," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(3), pages 471-494, August.
    13. Summers, Lawrence H, 1989. "Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 177-183, May.
    14. Nyman, John A., 1999. "The value of health insurance: the access motive," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-152, April.
    15. Marquis, M. Susan & Long, Stephen H., 1995. "Worker demand for health insurance in the non-group market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 47-63, May.
    16. Peter P. Wakker, 2008. "Explaining the characteristics of the power (CRRA) utility family," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(12), pages 1329-1344.
    17. Camerer, Colin F & Ho, Teck-Hua, 1994. "Violations of the Betweenness Axiom and Nonlinearity in Probability," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 167-196, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Christine Le Clainche & Pascale Lengagne, 2019. "The Effects of Mass Layoffs on Mental Health," Working Papers DT78, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised May 2019.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    complementary health insurance; welfare; risk aversion; expected utility;

    JEL classification:

    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_693_0407. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire). General contact details of provider: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique.htm .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.