IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cai/recosp/reco_573_0563.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Caractéristiques du juge et décisions en matière de pensions alimentaires. Une étude à partir de données expérimentales

Author

Listed:
  • Cécile Bourreau-Dubois
  • Myriam Doriat-Duban
  • Jean-Claude Ray

Abstract

This paper focuses on the factors which influence, in France, the behaviour of the judges who fix child support orders. The theoretical framework of arbitration models is adapted to build a judge?s utility function. Then our theoretical model is estimated with some original experimental data. Using multilevel models, we show that some judge?s characteristics (gender, matrimonial status and experience as judge) influence the child support order, but that impact remains low. Classification JEL : J52, K49, J12

Suggested Citation

  • Cécile Bourreau-Dubois & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Jean-Claude Ray, 2006. "Caractéristiques du juge et décisions en matière de pensions alimentaires. Une étude à partir de données expérimentales," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(3), pages 563-572.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_573_0563
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_573_0563
    Download Restriction: free
    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2006-3-page-563.htm
    Download Restriction: free
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard T. Boylan, 2004. "Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the Retirement Decisions of Federal Judges?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 231-253, January.
    2. Farber, Henry S & Bazerman, Max H, 1986. "The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 819-844, July.
    3. Flinn, Christopher J, 2000. "Modes of Interaction between Divorced Parents," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(3), pages 545-578, August.
    4. Kornhauser, Lewis A, 2000. "On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 1037-1057, June.
    5. Farber, Henry S & Bazerman, Max H, 1986. "The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1503-1528, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cécile Bourreau-Dubois & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Bruno Jeandidier & Jean-Claude Ray, 2023. "Do child support guidelines result in lower inter-judge disparity? The case of the French advisory child support guidelines," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 87-116, February.
    2. Cécile Bourreau-Dubois & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Jean-Claude Ray, 2014. "Child support order: how do judges decide without guidelines? Evidence from France," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 431-452, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cécile Bourreau-Dubois & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Jean-Claude Ray, 2014. "Child support order: how do judges decide without guidelines? Evidence from France," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 431-452, December.
    2. Marselli, Riccardo & McCannon, Bryan C. & Vannini, Marco, 2015. "Bargaining in the shadow of arbitration," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 356-368.
    3. Patricia A. Simpson & Joseph J. Martocchio, 1997. "The Influence of Work History Factors on Arbitration Outcomes," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(2), pages 252-267, January.
    4. James Andreoni & Ray D Madoff, 2007. "Overconfdence and Judicial Discretion: Do Winner-take-all Rules Discourage Pre-trial Agreement?," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000198, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Orley Ashenfelter & David E. Bloom & Gordon B. Dahl, 2013. "Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(3), pages 399-423, September.
    6. Miguel Á. Malo & Ángel Martín-Román & Alfonso Moral, 2018. "“Peer effects” or “quasi-peer effects” in Spanish labour court rulings," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 497-525, June.
    7. Gabuthy, Yannick & Jacquemet, Nicolas & Marchand, Nadège, 2008. "Does resorting to online dispute resolution promote agreements? Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 259-282, February.
    8. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
    9. David S. Kaplan & Joyce Sadka & Jorge Luis Silva‐Mendez, 2008. "Litigation and Settlement: New Evidence from Labor Courts in Mexico," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(2), pages 309-350, June.
    10. Daniel R. Marburger & Paul L. Burgess, 2004. "Can Prior Offers and Arbitration Outcomes Be Used to Predict the Winners of Subsequent Final‐Offer Arbitration Cases?," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 71(1), pages 93-102, July.
    11. Orley C. Ashenfelter & David E. Bloom & Gordon B. Dahl, 2013. "Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game: Evidence from Long Run Play," NBER Working Papers 18834, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Gershoni, Naomi, 2021. "Individual vs. group decision-making: Evidence from a natural experiment in arbitration proceedings," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    13. Klement, Alon & Neeman, Zvika, 2012. "Does Information about Arbitrators’Win/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy?," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275786, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    14. Orley Ashenfelter & Gordon Dahl, 2003. "Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration," Working Papers 857, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    15. Juan Pablo Montero, 2004. "A model of arbitration in regulation," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 219, Econometric Society.
    16. David E. Bloom, 1988. "Arbitrator Behavior in Public Sector Wage Disputes," NBER Chapters, in: When Public Sector Workers Unionize, pages 107-128, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Bloom, David E, 1986. "Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior under Conventional Arbitration," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 68(4), pages 578-585, November.
    18. Armstrong, Michael J. & Hurley, W. J., 2002. "Arbitration using the closest offer principle of arbitrator behavior," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 19-26, January.
    19. Orley Ashenfelter & Gordon B. Dahl, 2003. "Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration," Working Papers 857, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    20. Ashenfelter, Orley, et al, 1992. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1407-1433, November.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • K49 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Other
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_573_0563. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cairn.info/revue-economique.htm .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.