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Factors Affecting the Length of Time a Jury Deliberates: Case Characteristics and Jury Composition

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  • Brunell Thomas L.

    (University of Texas at Dallas)

  • Dave Chetan

    (University of Texas at Dallas)

  • Morgan Nicholas C.

    (Collin College)

Abstract

We examine the time it takes to reach a verdict (deliberation time) using a unique dataset on the deliberation times of actual juries in criminal and civil cases. Duration model results indicate that case complexity, the unanimity of verdicts and the process of voir dire affect deliberation times, whereas jury size, prior juror experience and the gender composition of juries are not significant correlates. The results shed empirical light on an important correlate of trial accuracy using real-world data, in contrast to previous research that employed mock jury data.

Suggested Citation

  • Brunell Thomas L. & Dave Chetan & Morgan Nicholas C., 2009. "Factors Affecting the Length of Time a Jury Deliberates: Case Characteristics and Jury Composition," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 555-578, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:5:y:2009:i:1:n:23
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1334
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bernard Grofman & Scott Feld, 1976. "A note on clique avoidance in repeated jury selection from among a fixed pool of jurors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 145-150, June.
    2. Sue H. Mialon, 2008. "The Effects of the Fourth Amendment: An Economic Analysis," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 22-44, May.
    3. Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, 2003. "Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 24-44, April.
    4. Neilson, William S. & Winter, Harold, 2000. "Bias and the economics of jury selection," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 223-250, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Francisco Pino & Jordi Vidal-Robert, "undated". "Habemus Papam? Polarization and Conflict in the Papal States," Working Papers wp492, University of Chile, Department of Economics.

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