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Majority rule or delegation? A normal noise case

Author

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  • Kitahara, Minoru
  • Sekiguchi, Yohei

Abstract

We analyze an election with costly information acquisition. We compare the outcome of a large election and that of a delegation. We show that the superiority between the two mechanisms is determined by the shape of the marginal cost function.

Suggested Citation

  • Kitahara, Minoru & Sekiguchi, Yohei, 2008. "Majority rule or delegation? A normal noise case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 36-39, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:1:p:36-39
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martinelli, Cesar, 2006. "Would rational voters acquire costly information?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 225-251, July.
    2. Minoru Kitahara & Yohei Sekiguchi, 2008. "Condorcet Jury Theorem or Rational Ignorance," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 281-300, April.
    3. Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, 2003. "Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 24-44, April.
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