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Recognition of Non-Controlling Interest in Consolidated Financial Statements Based on Property Rights

Author

Listed:
  • Casajus André

    (HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, Jahnallee 59, 04109Leipzig, Germany)

  • Labrenz Helfried

    (Institut für Unternehmensrechnung, Finanzierung und Besteuerung, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Leipzig, Grimmaische Str. 12, 04109Leipzig, Germany)

Abstract

We suggest a recognition of non-controlling interest in consolidated financial statements that takes into account the property rights structure within subsidiary companies, in particular, majority requirements on restructurings, which may differ between countries. Our approach rests on a property rights index based on cooperative game theory. This index captures a parent company’s ability to acquire future gains of the subsidiary.

Suggested Citation

  • Casajus André & Labrenz Helfried, 2017. "Recognition of Non-Controlling Interest in Consolidated Financial Statements Based on Property Rights," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 1-23, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:13:y:2017:i:3:p:23:n:3
    DOI: 10.1515/rle-2015-0050
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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