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Pseudo polynomial size LP formulation for calculating the least core value of weighted voting games

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  • Tanaka, Masato
  • Matsui, Tomomi

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a pseudo polynomial size LP formulation for finding a payoff vector in the least core of a weighted voting game. The numbers of variables and constraints in our formulation are both bounded by O(nW+), where n is the number of players and W+ is the total sum of (integer) voting weights. When we employ our formulation, a commercial LP solver calculates a payoff vector in the least core of practical weighted voting games in a few seconds. We also extend our approach to vector weighted voting games.

Suggested Citation

  • Tanaka, Masato & Matsui, Tomomi, 2022. "Pseudo polynomial size LP formulation for calculating the least core value of weighted voting games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 47-51.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:115:y:2022:i:c:p:47-51
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.12.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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