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Private Labeling and Competition between Retailers

Author

Listed:
  • Colangelo Giuseppe

    (Insubria University and Catholic University of Milan)

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of private labeling on retailer competition -an issue neglected in literature until now. Once implemented, private labeling may well be less favorable to society than previously thought because it can encourage consolidation of the retail industry. Either with linear pricing (when goods are not loose substitutes) or with wholesale price discrimination (when goods are not loose substitutes), the vertical channel is inclined to promote a retail monopoly while consumers prefer some retail competition. This conflict of interest would not arise in the absence of private labeling.

Suggested Citation

  • Colangelo Giuseppe, 2008. "Private Labeling and Competition between Retailers," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-36, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bjafio:v:6:y:2008:i:1:n:5
    DOI: 10.2202/1542-0485.1216
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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