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Unemployment Persistence And The Sustainability Of Exchange Rate Pegs

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  • Olli Castrén
  • Tuomas Takalo
  • Geoffrey Wood

Abstract

It is commonly thought that an open economy can accommodate output shocks through either exchange rate or real sector adjustments. We formalize this notion by incorporating unemployment persistence into a two‐sided escape clause model of currency crises. We show that unemployment persistence makes a currency peg more fragile and undermines the credibility of the monetary authority in a dynamic setting. The fragility is captured by a devaluation premium in expectations that increases the average inflation rate when the currency peg is more vulnerable to ‘busts’ than ‘booms’. This interaction between macroeconomic and microeconomic rigidities suggests that a policy reform can only be consistent if it renders either exchange rates or the economy more flexible.

Suggested Citation

  • Olli Castrén & Tuomas Takalo & Geoffrey Wood, 2010. "Unemployment Persistence And The Sustainability Of Exchange Rate Pegs," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 57(1), pages 85-102, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:57:y:2010:i:1:p:85-102
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2009.00508.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Begović, Selena & Adnett, Nick & Pugh, Geoff, 2016. "An investigation into the credibility of currency board arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 787-799.
    3. Emiliano Brancaccio & Nadia Garbellini, 2015. "Currency regime crises, real wages, functional income distribution and production," European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention, Edward Elgar Publishing, vol. 12(3), pages 255-276, December.
    4. Haiyang Shang & Fang Su & Serhat Yüksel & Hasan Dinçer, 2021. "Identifying the Strategic Priorities of the Technical Factors for the Sustainable Low Carbon Industry Based on Macroeconomic Conditions," SAGE Open, , vol. 11(2), pages 21582440211, May.

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