IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/popdev/v46y2020i2p249-285.html

Time Use and Household Division of Labor in India—Within‐Gender Dynamics

Author

Listed:
  • Abhilasha Srivastava

Abstract

Household allocation of labor is an important area of scholarship in developing countries where women's well‐being is affected by the heavy load of unpaid work within the household. This study extends nuclear household‐centric research on labor allocation by drawing attention to bargaining between female in‐laws in multigenerational households in India. This paper empirically tests two competing theories based on the impact of a daughter‐in‐law's education on household division of labor in multigenerational households. First is Caldwell's thesis that contends that increasing education would increase the bargaining power of daughter‐in‐law, thereby tilting the distribution of household labor in her favor, and the second is patriarchal bargain theory that makes an opposite claim. Both these theories are tested using time‐use data, and the latter is found to have higher explanatory power. Further layers are added to the analysis by tracing the effects of caste, class, and religion. Findings show that these mediate and determine the division of housework and bargaining outcomes between female in‐laws. This study emphasizes the need for an intersectional understanding of gender norms that are inextricably tied to factors such as religion, caste, class, and family structure. Findings also underline the need to study within‐gender dynamics systematically.

Suggested Citation

  • Abhilasha Srivastava, 2020. "Time Use and Household Division of Labor in India—Within‐Gender Dynamics," Population and Development Review, The Population Council, Inc., vol. 46(2), pages 249-285, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:popdev:v:46:y:2020:i:2:p:249-285
    DOI: 10.1111/padr.12309
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12309
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/padr.12309?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shireen J. Jejeebhoy & Zeba A. Sathar, 2001. "Women's Autonomy in India and Pakistan: The Influence of Religion and Region," Population and Development Review, The Population Council, Inc., vol. 27(4), pages 687-712, December.
    2. Sisir Debnath, 2015. "The Impact of Household Structure on Female Autonomy in Developing Countries," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(5), pages 485-502, May.
    3. Masaru Sasaki, 2002. "The Causal Effect of Family Structure on Labor Force Participation among Japanese Married Women," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(2), pages 429-440.
    4. Mukesh Eswaran & Bharat Ramaswami & Wilima Wadhwa, 2013. "Status, Caste, and the Time Allocation of Women in Rural India," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(2), pages 311-333.
    5. Anderson, Siwan & Eswaran, Mukesh, 2009. "What determines female autonomy? Evidence from Bangladesh," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 179-191, November.
    6. Meurs, Mieke & Slavchevska, Vanya, 2014. "Doing it all: Women’s employment and reproductive work in Tajikistan," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 786-803.
    7. Bina Agarwal, 1997. "''Bargaining'' and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 1-51.
    8. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
    9. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
    10. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 1996. "Economics in a Family Way," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(4), pages 1903-1934, December.
    11. Robert A. Pollak, 2005. "Bargaining Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production," NBER Working Papers 11239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Athary Janiso & Prakash Kumar Shukla & Bheemeshwar Reddy A, 2024. "What explains the gender gap in unpaid housework and care work in India?," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 42(1), January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bhattacharya, Leena, 2023. "Time allocation of daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law in India: The role of education as bargaining power," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1343, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    2. Dhanaraj, Sowmya & Mahambare, Vidya, 2019. "Family structure, education and women’s employment in rural India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 17-29.
    3. Malapit, Hazel Jean L., 2012. "Why do spouses hide income?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 584-593.
    4. Mishra, Khushbu & Sam, Abdoul G., 2016. "Does Women’s Land Ownership Promote Their Empowerment? Empirical Evidence from Nepal," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 360-371.
    5. Dhanaraj, Sowmya & Mahambare, Vidya, 2019. "Family structure, education and women’s employment in rural India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 17-29.
    6. Pelin Akyol & Zeynep Yılmaz, 2024. "Effects of Grandmothers' Proximity on Mothers' Labour Force Participation," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 86(5), pages 1122-1162, October.
    7. Balhasan Ali & Preeti Dhillon & Sivakami Muthusamy & Udaya Shankar Mishra, 2023. "Understanding Female Labour Force Participation and Domestic Work in India: The Role of Co-residence and Household Composition," Journal of Development Policy and Practice, , vol. 8(2), pages 162-193, July.
    8. Nabanita Datta Gupta & Leslie Stratton, 2010. "Examining the impact of alternative power measures on individual time use in American and Danish couple households," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 325-343, September.
    9. Ian Smith, 2003. "The Law and Economics of Marriage Contracts," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(2), pages 201-226, April.
    10. Nabanita Datta Gupta & Leslie S Stratton, 2008. "Institutions, Social Norms, and Bargaining Power: An Analysis of Individual Leisure Time in Couple Households," Working Papers 0806, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
    11. Holden, Stein & Bezu, Sosina, 2013. "Joint Land Certification and Intra-household Decision-making:Towards Empowerment of Wives?," CLTS Working Papers 14/13, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Centre for Land Tenure Studies, revised 10 Oct 2019.
    12. Selma Walther, 2017. "Moral hazard in marriage: the use of domestic labor as an incentive device," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 357-382, June.
    13. Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni, 2006. "Les modèles non unitaires de comportement du ménage : un survol de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 82(1), pages 9-52.
    14. Nuhu, Ahmed Salim, 2015. "Intra-Household Bargaining and Child Health Outcomes: Do Domestic Violence Laws Matter?," MPRA Paper 68630, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Jérôme De Henau, 2008. "Asymetric power within couples: the gendered effect of children and employment on entitlement to household income," Brussels Economic Review, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 51(2/3), pages 269-290.
    16. Nunley, John M. & Seals Jr., Richard Alan, 2011. "Child-custody reform, marital investment in children, and the labor supply of married mothers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 14-24, January.
    17. Bowles, Roger & Garoupa, Nuno, 2002. "Household dissolution, child care and divorce law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 495-510, December.
    18. Clémentine Sadania, 2016. "Working and Women’s Empowerment in the Egyptian Household: The Type of Work and Location Matter," Working Papers halshs-01525220, HAL.
    19. Robert A. Pollak, 2019. "How Bargaining in Marriage Drives Marriage Market Equilibrium," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 297-321.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:popdev:v:46:y:2020:i:2:p:249-285. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0098-7921 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.