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When Do Social Norms Replace Status‐Seeking Consumption? An Application To The Consumption Of Cleanliness

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  • Julia Sophie Woersdorfer

Abstract

Interdependencies in consumer behavior stem from either status‐seeking consumption or compliance with social norms. This paper analyzes how a consumption act changes from a means to signal the consumer's status to a means of norm compliance. It is shown that such a transformation can only be understood when consumer motivations other than social recognition are taken into account. We depict norm emergence as a learning process based on changing associations between a specific consumption act and widely shared, non‐subjectivist consumer needs. Our conjectures are illustrated by means of a case study: the emergence of the cleanliness norm in the 19th century.

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  • Julia Sophie Woersdorfer, 2010. "When Do Social Norms Replace Status‐Seeking Consumption? An Application To The Consumption Of Cleanliness," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 35-67, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:metroe:v:61:y:2010:i:1:p:35-67
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-999X.2009.04065.x
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    3. Eiji B. Hosoda, 2014. "An Analysis of Sorting and Recycling of Household Waste: A neo-Ricardian Approach," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 58-94, February.
    4. Ulrich Witt, 2017. "The evolution of consumption and its welfare effects," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 273-293, April.
    5. Chai Andreas & Moneta Alessio, 2014. "Escaping Satiation Dynamics: Some Evidence from British Household Data," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 234(2-3), pages 299-327, April.
    6. Oznur Ozdamar & Eleftherios Giovanis, 2017. "The Causal Effects of Income Support and Housing Benefits on Mental Well-Being: An Application of a Bayesian Network," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 398-424, July.
    7. Elena Druică & Rodica Ianole-Călin & Andreea-Ionela Puiu, 2023. "When Less Is More: Understanding the Adoption of a Minimalist Lifestyle Using the Theory of Planned Behavior," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-18, January.
    8. Christian Cordes, 2019. "The promises of a naturalistic approach: how cultural evolution theory can inform (evolutionary) economics," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 1241-1262, September.
    9. Ulrich Witt, 2011. "Sustainability and the Problem of Consumption," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2011-16, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
    10. Ho Fai Chan & Franklin G. Mixon & Jayanta Sarkar & Benno Torgler, 2022. "Recognition and longevity: an examination of award timing and lifespan in Nobel laureates," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 127(6), pages 3629-3659, June.

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