Splitting the Baby: An Empirical Test of Rules of Thumb in Regulatory Price Setting
This article provides an empirical evaluation of a recent and important exercise in regulatory price setting in the United States. The 1996 Telecommunications Act required incumbent local phone companies to sell components of their network to rival firms at regulated prices, and the prices for these 'unbundled network elements' were based primarily on independent estimates of forward-looking economic costs. Our econometric analysis reveals that, while cost is a primary determinant of element prices, the prices also reflect foregone retail profits for incumbent firms. Statistical tests suggest that 'splitting the baby' is an accurate positivist description of public agency behavior. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd..
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 58 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (07)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0023-5962|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:58:y:2005:i:3:p:331-351. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.