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A Simple Characterization of the Second‐best Two‐part and Block‐rate Tariffs Theory and Applications

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  • Jörg Borrmann

Abstract

The general necessary optimality conditions for second‐best discrete multipart tariffs are rather complex. In this paper, we derive a simplified characterization of these conditions for two‐part tariffs and for block‐rate tariffs for given thresholds of these tariffs. The simplified necessary optimality conditions are equivalent to the necessary conditions for a Ramsey‐optimum for goods with continuously variable individually demanded quantities. We demonstrate that this characterization of second‐best multipart tariffs can be helpful, when applying the usual regulatory mechanisms to these tariffs. In particular, we consider Vogelsang–Finsinger (1979) regulation as well as a particular form of price‐cap regulation which is related to the Laspeyres index of prices.

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  • Jörg Borrmann, 2003. "A Simple Characterization of the Second‐best Two‐part and Block‐rate Tariffs Theory and Applications," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(2), pages 205-228, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:annpce:v:74:y:2003:i:2:p:205-228
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-8292.00222
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    1. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    2. Brennan, Timothy J, 1989. "Regulating by Capping Prices," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 133-147, June.
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    5. Ingo Vogelsang & Jorg Finsinger, 1979. "A Regulatory Adjustment Process for Optimal Pricing by Multiproduct Monopoly Firms," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 157-171, Spring.
    6. David Sappington, 1980. "Strategic Firm Behavior under a Dynamic Regulatory Adjustment Process," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 360-372, Spring.
    7. James Hagerman, 1990. "Regulation by Price Adjustment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 72-82, Spring.
    8. Baumol, William J & Bradford, David F, 1970. "Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 265-283, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alberto Cassone & Carla Marchese, 2005. "Welfare Effects of Price Integration in Local Public Transport," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(2), pages 257-274, June.

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