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Electricity Transmission Pricing and Performance-based Regulation

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  • Ingo Vogelsang

Abstract

Performance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical for direct implementation, the insights from their properties can be combined with practical non-Bayesian mechanisms for application to transmission pricing. This combination suggests an approach based on the distinction between ultra-short, short and long periods. Ultra-short periods are marked by real-time pricing of point-to-point transmission services. Pricing in short periods involves fixed fees and adjustments via price-cap formulas or profit sharing. Productivity-enhancing incentives have to be tempered by long-term commitment considerations, so that profit sharing may dominate pure price caps. Investment incentives require long-term adjustments based on rate-of-return regulation with a “used and useful†criterion.

Suggested Citation

  • Ingo Vogelsang, 2006. "Electricity Transmission Pricing and Performance-based Regulation," The Energy Journal, , vol. 27(4), pages 97-126, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:enejou:v:27:y:2006:i:4:p:97-126
    DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol27-No4-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Sappington, 1983. "Optimal Regulation of a Multiproduct Monopoly with Unknown Technological Capabilities," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 453-463, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul L. Joskow, 2024. "The Expansion of Incentive (Performance-Based) Regulation of Electricity Distribution and Transmission in the United States," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(2), pages 455-503, September.

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