Backward Intergenerational Goods and Endogenous Fertility
This paper characterizes the consequences of introducing the public provision of intergenerational goods to the elderly in a model with endogenous fertility. With exogenous fertility, it has been shown that the government can mandate the first-best outcome by simply imposing the socially optimal transfer. By contrast, with endogenous fertility, the government can no longer enforce this outcome. This is due, in part, to the effects of mandatory provision on the birth rate. However, taxes may still have a salubrious effect on social welfare as they can eliminate particularly bad equilibria. Copyright © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
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