Environmental Policy, Innovation and Performance: New Insights on the Porter Hypothesis
Jaffe and Palmer (1997) present three distinct variants of the so-called Porter Hypothesis. The Â“weakÂ” version of the hypothesis posits that environmental regulation will stimulate certain kinds of environmental innovations. The Â“narrowÂ” version of the hypothesis asserts that flexible environmental policy regimes give firms greater incentive to innovate than prescriptive regulations, such as technology-based standards. Finally, the Â“strongÂ” version posits that properly designed regulation may induce cost-saving innovation that more than compensates for the cost of compliance. In this paper, we test the significance of these different variants of the Porter Hypothesis using data on the four main elements of the hypothesised causality chain (environmental policy, research and development, environmental performance and commercial performance). The analysis is based upon a unique database which includes observations from approximately 4200 facilities in seven OECD countries. In general, we find strong support for the Â“weakÂ” version, qualified support for the Â“narrowÂ” version, and qualified support for the Â“strongÂ” version as well. Jaffe et Palmer (1997) prÃ©sentent trois variantes distinctes de l'hypothÃ¨se de Porter. La version Â« faible Â» de l'hypothÃ¨se suppose que la rÃ©glementation environnementale stimulera l'apparition d'innovations dans le domaine de l'environnement. La version Â« Ã©troite Â» de l'hypothÃ¨se affirme que les rÃ©glementations environnementales flexibles donnent aux firmes une plus grande incitation pour innover que les rÃ©glementations rigides, telles que les normes prescrivant une technologie pour une industrie donnÃ©e. Enfin, la version Â« forte Â» pose qu'une rÃ©glementation correctement conÃ§ue peut induire davantage de gains en termes d'innovation que de coÃ»ts pour se conformer Ã la rÃ¨gle. Dans cet article, nous examinons la portÃ©e de ces diffÃ©rentes variantes de l'hypothÃ¨se de Porter en utilisant des donnÃ©es sur les quatre
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Volume (Year): 20 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (09)
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