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Leveraged Buybacks Of Sovereign Debt: A Model And An Application To Greece

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  • Angelo Baglioni

Abstract

type="main" xml:lang="en"> The model presented in this article shows that the outcome of a leveraged buyback of sovereign debt depends on the priority structure of the deal. If the institution lending the funds needed for the buyback is senior, the debtor country benefits from the deal: the government debt is reduced, implying a lower probability of default; at the same time, the deal makes the price of outstanding bonds go down, since their recovery rate declines. The opposite holds if the lending institution is junior. If the loan is underpriced, the implied subsidy is shared between the borrowing country and its bondholders, who can benefit from a price increase of their bonds. This is actually what happened with the buyback of Greek sovereign bonds in 2012, as it is shown in the empirical section. Those results do not depend on the share of country's endowment devoted to debt repayment, which instead plays a crucial role in shaping the outcome of unlevered buybacks . ( JEL F34, H63)

Suggested Citation

  • Angelo Baglioni, 2015. "Leveraged Buybacks Of Sovereign Debt: A Model And An Application To Greece," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(1), pages 87-103, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:33:y:2015:i:1:p:87-103
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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