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Debt Buybacks Signal Sovereign Countries' Creditworthiness: Theory and Tests

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  • Acharya, Sankarshan
  • Diwan, Ishac

Abstract

The authors show that debt buybacks could convey valuable information about indebted countries' willingness to invest and increase debt repayment when creditors are less informed than debtors. In an informational equilibrium, unwilling countries do not repurchase a part of their debt, but willing countries do; and creditors increase debt repayments by offering reliefs only to those countries that repurchase. Data show that creditors systematically grant debt reliefs only to countries with buyback programs; and a country's secondary market debt price is higher when it has a buyback program than if it does not. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Acharya, Sankarshan & Diwan, Ishac, 1993. "Debt Buybacks Signal Sovereign Countries' Creditworthiness: Theory and Tests," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(4), pages 795-817, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:34:y:1993:i:4:p:795-817
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Buiter,Willem H. & Marston,Richard C., 1986. "International Economic Policy Coordination," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521337809, March.
    2. Aizenman, Joshua, 1992. "Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seigniorage," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(1), pages 61-71, February.
    3. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
    4. Kornai, Janos, 1986. "The Hungarian Reform Process: Visions, Hopes, and Reality," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 24(4), pages 1687-1737, December.
    5. Cukierman, Alex & Edwards, Sebastian & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "Seigniorage and Political Instability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 537-555, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joshua Aizenman & Jorge Fernández-Ruiz, 2006. "Signaling Credibility --- Choosing Optimal Debt and International Reserves," NBER Working Papers 12407, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Aizenman, Joshua & Fernandez-Ruiz, Jorge, 2006. "Signaling credibility – choosing optimal debt and international reserves," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt2v64t0vh, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    3. Hossein Kazemi & Ayla Ogus, 2008. "The Determinants of the Secondary Market Price of Less Developed Countries’ Debt," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 36(2), pages 153-164, June.
    4. Silvia Marchesi, 2006. "Buybacks of domestic debt in public debt management," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(5), pages 379-400.
    5. Rune Hagen, 2012. "Certified or branded?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 203-230, June.
    6. Geske Dijkstra, 2013. "What Did US$18 bn Achieve? The 2005 Debt Relief to Nigeria," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 31(5), pages 553-574, September.
    7. Angelo Baglioni, 2015. "Leveraged Buybacks Of Sovereign Debt: A Model And An Application To Greece," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(1), pages 87-103, January.

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