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Experimental Work On Subsidies, Moral Hazard, And Market Power In Agricultural Markets

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  • OWEN R. PHILLIPS
  • AMY M. NAGLER
  • DALE J. MENKHAUS
  • CHRISTOPHER T. BASTIAN

Abstract

"Laboratory markets are created to capture the important features of agricultural commodity markets. Sellers make production decisions and hold inventories before goods are sold. In a posted-bid auction environment, price supports create a moral hazard for sellers. Part of the price-support subsidy is transferred to buyers in the form of lower prices, which are close to those predicted by the buyers' Cournot level. The subsidy program is expensive for this reason. Lump-sum payments correct the moral hazard problem and are better at transferring income to sellers. However, transfers made at the beginning of each production period cause a decline in production levels." ("JEL" D44, C92) Copyright (c) 2009 Western Economic Association International.

Suggested Citation

  • Owen R. Phillips & Amy M. Nagler & Dale J. Menkhaus & Christopher T. Bastian, 2010. "Experimental Work On Subsidies, Moral Hazard, And Market Power In Agricultural Markets," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(4), pages 488-501, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:28:y:2010:i:4:p:488-501
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ashenfelter, Orley & Genesove, David, 1992. "Testing for Price Anomalies in Real-Estate Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 501-505, May.
    2. Charles N. Noussair & Charles R. Plott & Raymond G. Riezman, 2013. "An Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 17, pages 299-328 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Daniel A. Sumner, 2005. "Production and Trade Effects of Farm Subsidies: Discussion," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(5), pages 1229-1230.
    4. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
    5. Owen Phillips & Dale Menkhaus & Joseph Krogmeier, 2001. "Laboratory Behavior in Spot and Forward Auction Markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(3), pages 243-256, December.
    6. Nigel Key & Ruben N. Lubowski & Michael J. Roberts, 2005. "Farm-Level Production Effects from Participation in Government Commodity Programs: Did the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act Make a Difference?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(5), pages 1211-1219.
    7. Barry K. Goodwin & Ashok K. Mishra, 2005. "Another Look at Decoupling: Additional Evidence on the Production Effects of Direct Payments," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(5), pages 1200-1210.
    8. Roth, Alvin E. & Malouf, Michael W. K. & Murnighan, J. Keith, 1981. "Sociological versus strategic factors in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 153-177, June.
    9. Plott, Charles R, 1982. "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1485-1527, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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