Determinants of a social clause in international trade negotiations

Survey data are used to examine the determinants of a “social clause” in international trade negotiations. Proponents of such a clause argue that the inclusion of labor laws, environmental impacts, and other social issues in international trade negotiations would ensure fair competition, an equitable distribution of the benefits of free trade, and, in the case of labor, protect the basic rights of workers. Opponents see these arguments as a disguised form of protectionism and self‐interest based on the protection of labor‐intensive industries in developed countries. Results from a logit model indicate a decreased likelihood for the inclusion of a social clause in international trade negotiations across farm sizes. In particular the results suggest that agricultural producers with annual gross sales including government payments between US$500,000 and US$999,000, are 40% less likely to want labor laws, environmental impacts, and food safety standards to be included as part of international trade negotiations. The results also show that agricultural producers with college experience or college degrees are less likely to want these social interventions while second generation farmers and first generation farmers with a master's degree want labor laws, environmental impacts, and food safety standards to be included as part of international trade negotiations.