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The Increase Of Performance Of An Entity By The Conversion Of The Hidden Costs

Author

Listed:
  • Sorin Briciu
  • Sorinel CăpuÅŸneanu

Abstract

This article offers an intrinsic image of the hidden and identified costs at the level of an entity, including the causes and their ways of control. The main research instrument used here was the questionnaire and the results determined a better knowledge of the theoretical and methodological aspects necessary in order to identify the hidden costs at the level of an entity. Several aspects of the hidden costs are discussed, as well as their characteristics, evaluation, causes and generating sources. The connections between disfunctionalities, the generating factors of the hidden costs and their financial components are presented in theory and represented in graphics. The article closes with the authors' conclusions on the identification, determination, conversion and presentation in a situation of synthesis of the hidden costs of an entity, as well as the importance managers should grant to it.

Suggested Citation

  • Sorin Briciu & Sorinel CăpuÅŸneanu, 2011. "The Increase Of Performance Of An Entity By The Conversion Of The Hidden Costs," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 2(13), pages 1-2.
    • Handle: RePEc:alu:journl:v:2:y:2011:i:13:p:2
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    File URL: http://oeconomica.uab.ro/upload/lucrari/1320112/02.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, "undated". "Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control," IEW - Working Papers 193, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Ernst Fehr & John A. List, 2004. "The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives-Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOs," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 743-771, September.
    3. Michael Kosfeld & Armin Falk, 2006. "The Hidden Costs of Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1611-1630, December.
    4. Henri Savall & Véronique Zardet & Marc Bonnet, 2008. "Releasing the untapped potential of enterprises through socio-economic management," Post-Print halshs-00780720, HAL.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gary COKINS & Sorinel CAPUSNEANU & Dan Ioan TOPOR & Oana Raluca Ivan, 2017. "The hidden costs of self-management services in the accounting activity of a company," The Audit Financiar journal, Chamber of Financial Auditors of Romania, vol. 15(146), pages 244-244.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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