IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ags/jloagb/14665.html

Marketing Channels Compete For U.S. Stocker Cattle

Author

Listed:
  • Schmitz, Troy G.
  • Moss, Charles B.
  • Schmitz, Andrew

Abstract

This study investigates the underlying reasons for a producer's choice of marketing channels for stocker cattle in the United States. In addition to traditional public auctions, private sales, video auctions, and Internet auctions have been recently used in the marketing of stocker cattle. Findings show that while the number of marketing options may have increased in recent years, only relatively large producers can actually take advantage of these options. The marketing options for smaller producers are still limited due to their relative size. Also, the number of cattle marketed privately and through video and Internet auctions is found to be positively correlated with herd size. In addition, the New Institutional Economics (NIE) provides insights into how herd size influences the choice of marketing channels.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmitz, Troy G. & Moss, Charles B. & Schmitz, Andrew, 2003. "Marketing Channels Compete For U.S. Stocker Cattle," Journal of Agribusiness, Agricultural Economics Association of Georgia, vol. 21(2), pages 1-18.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:jloagb:14665
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.14665
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/14665/files/21020131.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.14665?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fausti, Scott W. & Qasmi, Bashir A. & Landblom, Douglas G. & Beutler, Martin & Johnson, Patricia S. & Gates, Roger N. & Patterson, Hubert H. & Salverson, Robin R., 2007. "Public Price Reporting, Marketing Channel Selection, and Price Discovery: The Perspective of Cow/Calf Producers in the Dakotas," Journal of Agribusiness, Agricultural Economics Association of Georgia, vol. 25(01), pages 1-18.
    2. Gillespie, Jeffrey & Sitienei, Isaac & Bhandari, Basu & Scaglia, Guillermo, . "Grass-Fed Beef: How is it Marketed by US Producers?," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 19(2), pages 1-18.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Liu, Shulin & Wang, Mingxi, 2010. "Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 1-3, April.
    2. Francesco Guala & Andrea Salanti, 2002. "On the Robustness of Economic Models," Working Papers (-2012) 0208, University of Bergamo, Department of Economics.
    3. Drexl, Andreas & Jørnsten, Kurt & Knof, Diether, 2009. "Non-linear anonymous pricing combinatorial auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 199(1), pages 296-302, November.
    4. Madureira, António & den Hartog, Frank & Bouwman, Harry & Baken, Nico, 2013. "Empirical validation of Metcalfe’s law: How Internet usage patterns have changed over time," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 246-256.
    5. Scheufele, Gabriela & Bennett, Jeff, 2017. "Can payments for ecosystem services schemes mimic markets?," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 30-37.
    6. Christopher Boyer & B. Brorsen & Tong Zhang, 2014. "Common-value auction versus posted-price selling: an agent-based model approach," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 9(1), pages 129-149, April.
    7. Dominique Bouf & Yves Crozet & Sophie Masson & Pierre-Yves Péguy & Stéphanie Souche & Bjørnar Andreas Kvinge & Ioan Cuncev & Paola Cossu & Henning Tegner, 2003. "Overview of Infrastructure Charging, part 4, IMPROVERAIL Project Deliverable 9, “Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems”," Post-Print halshs-00142744, HAL.
    8. Leonardo Rezende, 2009. "Biased procurement auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 169-185, January.
    9. Julie Brux & Claudine Desrieux, 2014. "To allot or not to allot public services? An incomplete contract approach," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 455-476, June.
    10. Chun-Miin (Jimmy) Chen & Matthew D. Bailey, 2018. "Game—Introduction to Reverse Auctions: The BucknellAuto Game," INFORMS Transactions on Education, INFORMS, vol. 18(2), pages 116-126, January.
    11. Daniel C. Hardy, 2001. "Profitability and Pricing in Treasury Bill Auctions: Evidence from Pakistan," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 40(1), pages 27-48.
    12. Angelo Ranaldo & Enzo Rossi, 2016. "Uniform-price auctions for Swiss government bonds: Origin and evolution," Economic Studies 2016-10, Swiss National Bank.
    13. Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, 2005. "A Laboratory Comparison of Uniform and Discriminative Price Auctions for Reducing Non-point Source Pollution," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 81(1).
    14. Polanski Arnold & Cardona Daniel, 2012. "Multilevel Mediation in Symmetric Trees," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 1-23, September.
    15. Breitmoser, Yves, 2017. "Knowing Me, Imagining You:," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 36, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    16. Sundström, David, 2016. "The Competition Effect in a Public Procurement Model: An error-in-variables approach," Umeå Economic Studies 920, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 17 Jun 2016.
    17. Pickl, Matthias & Wirl, Franz, 2011. "Auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity--The case of Nabucco and its open season," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 2143-2151, April.
    18. Crawford, Vincent P. & Kuo, Ping-Sing, 2003. "A dual Dutch auction in Taipei: the choice of numeraire and auction form in multi-object auctions with bundling," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 427-442, August.
    19. Seokjoo Andrew Chang, 2012. "Time dynamics of overlapping e-auction mechanisms: Information transfer, strategic user behavior and auction revenue," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 331-342, April.
    20. Che,Y.-K. & Kim,J., 2001. "Know thy enemies : knowledge of rivals' types and its effect on auctions," Working papers 9, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:jloagb:14665. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaggea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.