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Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation, and Career Prospects

Author

Listed:
  • Ron Kaniel
  • Dmitry Orlov

Abstract

Adverse selection benefits firms able to identify talent. An informed intermediary expropriates agents' ability by threatening to fire and expose them to undervaluation of their skill. An agent's track record gradually reduces intermediary's information advantage. In response, the intermediary starts churning well-performing agents she knows are less skilled. The accelerated reduction in information advantage boosts profits, as retained agents accept below-reservation wages to build reputation faster. Agents prefer starting their careers working for an intermediary, as benefits from building reputation faster more than offset expropriation costs. Our analysis applies to professions where talent is essential and performance is publicly observable.

Suggested Citation

  • Ron Kaniel & Dmitry Orlov, 2025. "Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation, and Career Prospects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 115(10), pages 3638-3674, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:115:y:2025:i:10:p:3638-74
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200169
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

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