An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria

Citations

Cited by:

1. Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
2. Magnoli Bocchi, Alessandro, 2008. "Rising growth, declining investment : the puzzle of the Philippines," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4472, The World Bank.
3. Blume, Andreas & Franco, April Mitchell, 2007. "Decentralized learning from failure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 504-523, March.
4. Michael Hechter, 1992. "The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 33-40, January.
5. Flesch, János & Perea, Andrés, 2009. "Repeated games with voluntary information purchase," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 126-145, May.
6. Johannes Horner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2009. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2010.
7. Holcomb, James H. & Nelson, Paul S., 1997. "The role of monitoring in duopoly market outcomes," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 79-93.
8. Chan, Jimmy & Zhang, Wenzhang, 2023. "Self-evident events and the value of linking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
9. Rand, David G. & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna, 2015. "It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 481-499.
   • Rand, David Gertler & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna, 2015. "It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games," Scholarly Articles 27304431, Harvard University Department of Economics.
10. Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2006. "Private monitoring in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 179-211, November.
    • Andreas Blume & Paul Heidhues, 2003. "Private Monitoring in Auctions," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
11. Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for - 1 and a Folk Theorem," Post-Print hal-00543616, HAL.
    • Johannes Horner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for ! ! 1 and a Folk Theorem," Working Papers 1264, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
12. Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1993. "Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(3), pages 599-611.
    • Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1992. "Efficient and Nearly Efficient Partnerships," Discussion Papers 991R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Patrick Legros & Steven Matthews, 1993. "Efficient and nearly efficient partnerships," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7040, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
13. Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 16-39, January.
    • van Damme, E.E.C. & Bhaskar, V., 1997. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Discussion Paper 1997-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2002. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Other publications TiSEM 432fc615-feb9-4c90-8a14-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • van Damme, E.E.C. & Bhaskar, V., 1997. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Other publications TiSEM fcc97407-becb-465c-9856-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
14. Cole, Harold L. & Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 2005. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 59-72, October.
    • Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2000. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Working Papers 604, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    • Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2001. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Staff Report 287, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
15. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 2003. "Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 227-250, August.
16. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
17. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.
18. Cetemen, Doruk & Hwang, Ilwoo & Kaya, Ayça, 2020. "Uncertainty-driven cooperation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
19. Miyagawa, Eiichi & Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2008. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 192-221, March.
    • Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs," KIER Working Papers 597, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    • Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi & Eiichi Miyagawa, 2007. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs," 2007 Meeting Papers 751, Society for Economic Dynamics.
20. Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2016. "Repeated games with public information revisited," PSE Working Papers hal-01285326, HAL.
    • Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2016. "Repeated games with public information revisited," Working Papers hal-01285326, HAL.
21. Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2016. "Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 311-323.
    • Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships," KIER Working Papers 650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
22. Francesco Lancia & Alessia Russo, 2011. "Self-Commitment-Institutions and Cooperation in Overlapping Generations Games," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 073, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    • Francesco Lancia & Alessia Russo, 2011. "Self-Commitment-Institutions and Cooperation in Overlapping Generations Games," Department of Economics 0668, University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi".
23. Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul & Gerhard Riener, 2012. "Partnerships, Imperfect Monitoring and Outside Options: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Alexia Gaudeul & Paolo Crosetto & Gerhard Riener, 2015. "Of the stability of partnerships when individuals have outside options, or why allowing exit is inefficient," Jena Economics Research Papers 2015-001, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Gaudeul, A. & Crosetto, P. & Riener, G., 2014. "Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships. An experiment," Working Papers 2014-02, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
24. Eduardo Monteiro & Humberto Moreira, 2006. "Effciency In Two Player Repeated Games Of Imperfect Monitoring," Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 113, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
25. Yuki Kumagai, 2010. "Networks and Markets. The dynamic impacts of information, matching and transaction costs on trade," Discussion Papers 2010-07, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
26. , H. & ,, 2016. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
27. Volker Nocke & Roland Strausz, 2023. "Collective Brand Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(1), pages 1-58.
    • Nocke, Volker & Strausz, Roland, 2021. "Collective Brand Reputation," CEPR Discussion Papers 15732, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Volker Nocke & Roland Strausz, 2021. "Collective Brand Reputation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_281, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Nocke, Volker & Strausz, Roland, 2022. "Collective Brand Reputation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 324, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
28. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1987. "Le risque moral dans la relation de mandat," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(1), pages 5-24.
29. Mihaela Schaar & Yuanzhang Xiao & William Zame, 2015. "Efficient outcomes in repeated games with limited monitoring," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(1), pages 1-34, September.
30. Rafael Rob & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2006. "Reputation and turnover," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(2), pages 341-361, June.
    • Rafael Rob & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "Reputation and Turnover," KIER Working Papers 594, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    • Rafael Rob & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "Reputation and Turnover," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-032, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
31. Damien S Eldridge, 2007. "A Shirking Theory of Referrals," Working Papers 2007.05, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
    • Damien S Eldridge, 2007. "A Shirking Theory of Referrals," Working Papers 2007.05, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
    • Damien S.Eldridge, 2013. "A shirking theory of referrals," Working Papers 2013.01, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
32. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Muriel Niederle & Josef Perktold, 2000. "Market Institutions and Quality Enforcement," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1482, Econometric Society.
33. Laclau, Marie & Tomala, Tristan, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 400-424.
    • Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," Post-Print halshs-01503768, HAL.
    • Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01503768, HAL.
34. Abreu, Dilip & Milgrom, Paul & Pearce, David, 1991. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1713-1733, November.
    • David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Paul R. Milgrom, 1988. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 875, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Dilip Abreu & Paul Milgrom & David Pearce, 1997. "Information and timing in repeated partnerships," Levine's Working Paper Archive 636, David K. Levine.
35. Terrence August & Hyoduk Shin & Tunay I. Tunca, 2018. "Generating Value Through Open Source: Software Service Market Regulation and Licensing Policy," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 29(1), pages 186-205, March.
36. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998. "Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 311-336, November.
    • d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 1998. "Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: an overview," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
37. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2009. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 233-265.
    • Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000009, David K. Levine.
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2009. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," Scholarly Articles 3160491, Harvard University Department of Economics.
38. Takuo Sugaya, 2022. "Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring [Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(4), pages 2201-2256.
39. Battaglini, Marco, 2006. "Joint production in teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 138-167, September.
    • Battaglini, Marco, 2004. "Joint Production in Teams," CEPR Discussion Papers 4702, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
40. James M. Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    • James Malcomson, 2010. "Relational Incentive Contracts," Economics Series Working Papers 508, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
41. Weinschenk, Philipp, 2021. "On the benefits of time-inconsistent preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 185-195.
42. David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Ennio Stacchetti, 1989. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 920, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
43. Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018. "Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
    • Juan F. Escobar & Gastón Llanes, 2015. "Cooperation Dynamic in Repeated Games of Adverse Selection," Documentos de Trabajo 311, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
44. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1984. "Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 726, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
45. Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 281, UCLA Department of Economics.
46. Gregorio Curello, 2021. "Incentives for Collective Innovation," Papers 2109.01885, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
47. Takizawa, Shinichiro, 2008. "The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 165-168, August.
48. Alistair Wilson & Hong Wu, 2014. "Dissolution of Partnerships in Infinitely Repeated Games," Working Paper 532, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Aug 2014.
49. Fischer, Gregory, 2013. "Contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 46796, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
50. David Rahman, 2014. "The Power of Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3737-3751, November.
51. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from private information in noisy repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1733-1769, September.
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
52. Njoroge Kenneth, 2003. "Information Pooling and Collusion: Implications for The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-15, May.
53. Andreas Blume & April Franco, 2002. "Learning from failure," Staff Report 299, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
54. Özalp Özer & Yanchong Zheng & Kay-Yut Chen, 2011. "Trust in Forecast Information Sharing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(6), pages 1111-1137, June.
55. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Grigory Kosenok, 2009. "Fine-Tailored for the Cartel-Favoritism in Procurement," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(1), pages 95-121, September.
    • Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Grigory Kosenok, 2009. "Fine-Tailored for the Cartel-Favoritism in Procurement," Post-Print halshs-00754339, HAL.
    • Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Grigory Kosenok, 2009. "Fine-Tailored for the Cartel-Favoritism in Procurement," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754339, HAL.
56. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2001. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 158-178, May.
    • Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-24, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
57. Radner, Roy, 1991. "Dynamic games in organization theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-2), pages 217-260, July.
    • Radner, Roy, 1989. "Dynamic Games in Organization Theory," Working Paper Series 228, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised Feb 1991.
58. Steven R. Williams & Roy Radner, 1988. "Efficiency in Partnership When The Joint Output is Uncertain," Discussion Papers 760, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
59. René Levínský & Abraham Neyman & Miroslav Zelený, 2020. "Should I remember more than you? Best responses to factored strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1105-1124, December.
60. Curello, Gregorio, 2023. "Incentives for Collective Innovation," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277708, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
61. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 14, pages 309-330, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1991. "An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 26-47, June.
    • Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information," Working papers 525, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    • D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, David K. Levine.
62. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 499-519, March.
    • Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-255, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    • Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," UCLA Economics Working Papers 826, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000055, UCLA Department of Economics.
63. Eric Maskin, 2001. "Roy Radner and Incentive Theory," Economics Working Papers 0004, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
64. Emilio Bisetti & Benjamin Tengelsen & Ariel Zetlin‐Jones, 2022. "Moral Hazard In Remote Teams," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1595-1623, November.
65. Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2013. "Folk Theorems, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-022, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Apr 2013.
66. D’Ignazio, Alessio & Giovannetti, Emanuele, 2015. "Predicting internet commercial connectivity wars: The impact of trust and operators’ asymmetry," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 1127-1137.
67. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 151-188, January.
68. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 106-150, January.
69. Hendrik Hakenes & Svetlana Katolnik, 2018. "Optimal Team Size and Overconfidence," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 665-687, August.
70. Wilson, Alistair J. & Wu, Hong, 2017. "At-will relationships: How an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 487-507.
71. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Apr 2017.
72. Madanmohan Ghosh & Carlo Perroni & John Whalley, 1999. "The Value of MFN Treatment to Developing Countries," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 9916, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
73. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1986. "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 791, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
74. Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, 2020. "Information exchange in cartels," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 421-446, June.
75. Weinschenk, Philipp, 2016. "Procrastination in teams and contract design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 264-283.
76. Joshua Herries & Daniel I. Rees & Jeffrey S. Zax, 2003. "Interdependence in worker productivity," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(5), pages 585-604.
77. Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul & Gerhard Riener, 2012. "Partnerships, Imperfect Monitoring and Outside Options: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Alexia Gaudeul & Paolo Crosetto & Gerhard Riener, 2014. "Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships. An experiment," Jena Economics Research Papers 2014-012, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Gaudeul, A. & Crosetto, P. & Riener, G., 2014. "Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships. An experiment," Working Papers 2014-02, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
78. Yuki Kumagai, 2010. "Networks and Markets. The dynamic impacts of information, matching and transaction costs on trade," Discussion Papers 2010-07, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
79. Cici, Gjergji & Jaspersen, Stefan & Kempf, Alexander, 2015. "Speed of information diffusion within fund families," CFR Working Papers 15-02 [rev.], University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
80. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1997. "Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 632, David K. Levine.
81. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997. "Private observation and Communication and Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1256, David K. Levine.
82. Takaomi Notsu, 2023. "Collusion with capacity constraints under a sales maximization rationing rule," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 485-516, June.
83. Heller, Yuval & Sturrock, David, 2020. "Promises and endogenous reneging costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
84. Aumann, Robert J., 1997. "Rationality and Bounded Rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 2-14, October.
85. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-154, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
86. Michihiro Kandori, 2011. "Weakly Belief‐Free Equilibria in Repeated Games With Private Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(3), pages 877-892, May.
    • Michihiro Kandori, 2007. "Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-491, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
87. Sherstyuk, Katerina, 1998. "Efficiency in partnership structures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 331-346, August.
    • Sherstyuk, K., 1997. "Efficiency in Partnership Structures," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 552, The University of Melbourne.
88. Miller, Nolan H., 1997. "Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 285-299, December.
89. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time," MPRA Paper 13105, University Library of Munich, Germany.
90. Yuki Kumagai, 2009. "Networks and Markets: The dynamic impacts of information, matching and transaction costs on global trade," Discussion Papers 2009-22, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
91. Heller, Yuval & Sturrock, David, 2017. "Promises and Endogenous Reneging Costs," MPRA Paper 78803, University Library of Munich, Germany.
92. David G. Pearce, 1987. "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 855, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
93. Yuki Kumagai, 2009. "Networks and Markets: The dynamic impacts of information, matching and transaction costs on global trade," Discussion Papers 2009-22, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
94. Flesch, J. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2007. "Repeated games with voluntary information purchase," Research Memorandum 057, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
95. Takuo Sugaya & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
96. Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori, 2012. "Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 636-647.
97. Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1449, Econometric Society.