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Efficiency in partnership structures

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  • Sherstyuk, Katerina

Abstract

The paper investigates the sources and efficiency of the existing ranking of professional partnerships or research groups into upper and lower tiers.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 36 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 331-346

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:36:y:1998:i:3:p:331-346

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References

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  1. Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1986. "Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 101-117, February.
  2. Guesnerie Roger & Oddou Claude, 1979. "Second best taxation as a game," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 7919, CEPREMAP.
  3. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
  4. Greenberg, Joseph, 1994. "Coalition structures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 37, pages 1305-1337 Elsevier.
  5. Michael E. Conroy & Richard Dusansky, 1995. "The Productivity of Economics Departments in the U.S.: Publications in the Core Journals," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(4), pages 1966-1971, December.
  6. Kremer, Michael, 1993. "The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(3), pages 551-75, August.
  7. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-17, August.
  8. Chongwoo Choe, 1995. "Core of a Production Economy Revisited," Working Papers 1995.21, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
  9. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
  10. Cameron, Samuel & Collins, Alan, 1997. "Transaction costs and partnerships: The case of rock bands," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 171-183, February.
  11. Radner, Roy & Myerson, Roger & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 59-69, January.
  12. Michael Kremer & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill," NBER Working Papers 5718, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1, octubre-d.
  14. repec:fth:latrob:95.21 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Landers, Renee M & Rebitzer, James B & Taylor, Lowell J, 1996. "Rat Race Redux: Adverse Selection in the Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 329-48, June.
  16. Sherstyuk, K., 1997. "Multisided Matching Games," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 544, The University of Melbourne.
  17. Whitney, James D, 1993. "Bidding Till Bankrupt: Destructive Competition in Professional Team Sports," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(1), pages 100-115, January.
  18. Quint, Thomas, 1991. "The core of an m-sided assignment game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 487-503, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Heintzelman, Martin D. & Salant, Stephen W. & Schott, Stephan, 2009. "Putting free-riding to work: A Partnership Solution to the common-property problem," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 309-320, May.
  2. Breton, Michele & St-Amour, Pascal & Vencatachellum, Desire, 2003. "Dynamic production teams with strategic behavior," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 875-905, March.
  3. Oriol Tejada & Carles Rafels, 2009. "Competitive prices of homogeneous goods in multilateral markets," Working Papers 370, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  4. Oriol Tejada, 2013. "Analysis of the core of multisided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 189-205, April.

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