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Research governance in academia: are there alternatives to academic rankings?

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  • Margit Osterloh
  • Bruno S. Frey

Abstract

Peer reviews and rankings today are the backbone of research governance, but recently came under scrutiny. They take explicitly or implicitly agency theory as a theoretical basis. The emerging psychological economics opens a new perspective. As scholarly research is a mainly curiosity driven endeavor, we include intrinsic motivation and supportive feedback by the peers as important determinants of scholarly behavior. We discuss whether a stronger emphasis on selection and socialization offers an alternative to the present regime of academic rankings.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich in its series IEW - Working Papers with number 423.

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Date of creation: Aug 2009
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Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:423

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Keywords: Peer reviews; rankings; research governance; agency theory; psychological economics; new public management; economics of science; control theory;

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Cited by:
  1. Torgler, Benno & Piatti, Marco, 2011. "A Century of American Economic Review," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt6h59v4m6, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  2. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2011. "Kaderschmieden der Wirtschaft und/oder Universitäten? Der Auftrag der Wirtschaftsuniversitäten und –fakultäten im 21. Jahrhundert," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(3), pages 317-337, 08.

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