AbstractResearch rankings based on publications and citations today dominate governance of academia. Yet they have unintended side effects on individual scholars and academic institutions and can be counterproductive. They induce a substitution of the "taste for science" by a "taste for publication". We suggest as alternatives careful selection and socialization of scholars, supplemented by periodic self-evaluations and awards. Neither should rankings be a basis for the distributions of funds within universities. Rather, qualified individual scholars should be supported by basic funds to be able to engage in new and unconventional research topics and methods.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2011-16.
Date of creation: Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Academic governance; rankings; motivation; selection; socialization;
Other versions of this item:
- A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-09-05 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EDU-2011-09-05 (Education)
- NEP-HPE-2011-09-05 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-IPR-2011-09-05 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-MIC-2011-09-05 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-SOG-2011-09-05 (Sociology of Economics)
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