Organizational Control Systems and Pay-for-Performance in the Public Service
AbstractUnder certain conditions, output related performance measurement and pay-for-performance produce negative outcomes. We argue that in public service, these negative effects are stronger than in the private sector. We combine Behavioural Economics and Management Control Theory to determine under which conditions this is the case. We suggest as alternatives to the dominant output related pay-for-performance systems selection and socialization, exploratory use of output performance measures, and awards.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2013-11.
Date of creation: Jun 2013
Date of revision:
organization control; organizational forms; public administration; organizations; public service motivation;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-08-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2013-08-31 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CSE-2013-08-31 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-HRM-2013-08-31 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-NPS-2013-08-31 (Nonprofit & Public Sector)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Organizational Control Systems and Pay-for-Performance in the Public Service
by Alessandro Cerboni in Knowledge Team on 2013-09-16 18:07:05
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anna-Lea Werlen).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.