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When will we ever learn ?

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  • Johansson Vicki

Abstract

This paper puts forward the argument that Performance Measurement Systems (PMSs) foster rational, self-interested behaviour and vested values at all levels within organisations, which weakens moral barriers preventing fraud, fabrication of data and bribery. It argues that the longer a PMS is in operation, the greater the probability that rational self-interested behaviour in conflict with fundamental values and goals will be consolidated, aggravated and disseminated within organisations that operate within public welfare policy. If implemented, common incentives aimed at counteracting undesirable behaviour aggravate and speed up this process rather than reversing it. In a worst-case scenario, PMSs are the first step toward corruption, even though PMSs have been implemented with the good intention of improving public policy and strengthening accountability.

Suggested Citation

  • Johansson Vicki, 2015. "When will we ever learn ?," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 8(2), pages 149-170, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:njopap:v:8:y:2015:i:2:p:149-170:n:7
    DOI: 10.1515/nispa-2015-0013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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