Doctor Behaviour under a Pay for Performance Contract: Treating, Cheating and Case Finding?
Abstract
The UK National Health Service introduced a pay for performance scheme for primary care providers in 2004/5. The scheme rewarded providers for the proportion of eligible patients who received appropriate treatment. Eligible patients were those who had been reported by the provider as having the relevant disease minus those they exception reported as not suitable for treatment. Using rich provider level data, we find that differences in reported disease rates between providers, and differences in exception rates both between and within providers, suggest gaming. Faced with ratio performance indicators, providers acted on denominators as well as numerators. Copyright � The Author(s). Journal compilation � Royal Economic Society 2010.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 120 (2010)
Issue (Month): 542 (02)
Pages: F129-F156
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Citations
Blog mentions
As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:- Sifting through data to detect deliberate misreporting in pay-for-performance schemes
by Jed Friedman in Development Impact on 2012-10-17 09:06:37
Cited by:
- Dusheiko, Mark & Gravelle, Hugh & Martin, Stephen & Rice, Nigel & Smith, Peter C., 2011.
"Does better disease management in primary care reduce hospital costs? Evidence from English primary care,"
Journal of Health Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 919-932.
- Mark Dusheiko & Hugh Gravelle & Stephen Martin & Nigel Rice & Peter Smith, . "Does better disease management in primary care reduce hospital costs? Evidence from English primary care," Discussion Papers 11/15, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Nolan, Anne & O'Reilly, Jacqueline & Smith, Samantha & Brick, Aoife, 2011. "The Potential Role of Pay-for-Performance in Irish Health Care," Papers EC4, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
- Simon Burgess & Carol Propper & Marisa Ratto & Emma Tominey, 2011.
"Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency,"
The Centre for Market and Public Organisation
11/265, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Simon Burgess & Carol Propper & Marisa Ratto & Emma Tominey, 2004. "Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/103, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Burgess, Simon & Propper, Carol & Ratto, Marisa & Tominey, Emma, 2012. "Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency," CEPR Discussion Papers 9071, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Burgess, Simon & Propper, Carol & Ratto, Marisa & Tominey, Emma, 2012. "Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency," IZA Discussion Papers 6738, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Mark Dusheiko & Hugh Gravelle & Stephen Martin & Nigel Rice & Peter C Smith, 2011. "Does Better Disease Management in Primary Care Reduce Hospital Costs?," Working Papers 065cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
- G. Fiorentini & M. Lippi Bruni & C. Ugolini, 2012. "GPs and hospital expenditures. Should we keep expenditure containment programs alive?," Working Papers wp829, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Pike, Chris, 2010. "An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of GP Competition," MPRA Paper 27613, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Fiorentini, Gianluca & Lippi Bruni, Matteo & Ugolini, Cristina, 2013. "GPs and hospital expenditures. Should we keep expenditure containment programs alive?," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 10-20.
- E. Iezzi & M. Lippi Bruni & C. Ugolini, 2011. "The role of GP’s compensation schemes in diabetes care: evidence from panel data," Working Papers wp766, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
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