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The lifeboat problem

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  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Kovenock, Dan

Abstract

We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes (lifeboat seats). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes (lifeboats). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition (a lifeboat). Then each player competes for a prize in the subset chosen (a seat). We characterize and compare the subgame perfect equilibria in which all players employ pure strategies or all players play identical mixed strategies in the first stage. We find that the partitioning of prizes allows for coordination failure among players when they play nondegenerate mixed strategies and this can shelter rents and reduce rent dissipation compared to some of the less efficient pure strategy equilibria. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" with number SP II 2011-106.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii2011106

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Keywords: All-pay contest; multiple prizes; rent dissipation; lifeboat;

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Cited by:
  1. Kai Konrad, 2012. "Information alliances in contests with budget limits," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 679-693, June.
  2. John Morgan & Dana Sisak & Felix Vardy, 2012. "On the Merits of Meritocracy," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-077/1, Tinbergen Institute.

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