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The economic role of valuers in real property markets

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  • Bartke, Stephan

Abstract

Globally, real estate trade is highly regularized. Usually, the market value is not negotiated simply between the seller and potential buyer but based on an assessment performed by a professional valuer, known as a surveyor or appraiser. This paper inquires about the economic role of valuers in real estate markets. An institutionally embedded framework for valuation intermediation is developed that elucidates a multi-tiered imperfect information cascade. First, the valuer is understood as middleman counteracting information uncertainties on product quality of real estate. An additional constraint is constituted by information asymmetries between valuer and contractor. Drawing on New Institutional Economics, we discuss how the valuation professional with regularizations evolves globally as the superior institutional response to this cascade of information imperfections. A case of empirical evidence is provided for this concept of the regularized valuer.

Suggested Citation

  • Bartke, Stephan, 2015. "The economic role of valuers in real property markets," UFZ Discussion Papers 13/2015, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ufzdps:132015
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    2. Liebelt, Veronika & Bartke, Stephan & Schwarz, Nina, 2018. "Revealing Preferences for Urban Green Spaces: A Scale-sensitive Hedonic Pricing Analysis for the City of Leipzig," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 536-548.
    3. Bartosz Bartkowski & Bernd Hansjürgens & Stefan Möckel & Stephan Bartke, 2018. "Institutional Economics of Agricultural Soil Ecosystem Services," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(7), pages 1-14, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Transaction Costs; Asymmetric Information; Property Law; Information and Product Quality; Real Estate Services; Contaminated Land;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services

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