Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

What Drives Taxi Drivers? A Field Experiment on Fraud in a Market for Credence Goods

Contents:

Author Info

  • Loukas Balafoutas
  • Adrian Beck
  • Rudolf Kerschbamer
  • Matthias Sutter

Abstract

Credence goods are characterized by informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers that invite fraudulent behaviour by sellers. This article presents a natural field experiment on taxi rides in Athens, Greece, set up to measure different types of fraud and to examine the influence of passengers' presumed information and income on the extent of fraud. We find that passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on significantly longer detours, while lack of information on the local tariff system increases the likelihood of manipulated bills by about fifteen percentage points. Passengers' perceived income seems to have no effect on fraud. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rds049
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 80 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 876-891

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:80:y:2013:i:3:p:876-891

Contact details of provider:

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
  2. Vincent P Crawford & Juanjuan Meng, 2008. "New York City Cabdrivers’ Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets for Hours and Income," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002281, David K. Levine.
  3. Henry S. Schneider, 2012. "Agency Problems and Reputation in Expert Services: Evidence from Auto Repair," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 406-433, 09.
  4. John List, 2006. "Field experiments: A bridge between lab and naturally occurring data," Artefactual Field Experiments 00083, The Field Experiments Website.
  5. Lorenz Goette & David Huffman & Stephan Meier, 2006. "The impact of group membership on cooperation and norm enforcement: evidence using random assignment to real social groups," Working Papers 06-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  6. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter & Uwe Dulleck, 2009. "The Impact of Distributional Preferences on (Experimental) Markets for Expert Services," Working Papers 2009-28, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  7. Jim C. Cox & Daniel Friedman & Vjollca Sadiraj, 2005. "Revealed Altruism," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000595, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Dulleck, Uwe & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Sutter, Matthias, 2009. "The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition," IZA Discussion Papers 4030, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  9. Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004. "Field Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December.
  10. Gary Charness & Luca Rigotti & Aldo Rustichini, 2007. "Individual Behavior and Group Membership," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1340-1352, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Balafoutas, Loukas & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Sutter, Matthias, 2013. "Second-Degree Moral Hazard in a Real-World Credence Goods Market," IZA Discussion Papers 7714, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Adrian Beck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Jianying Qiu & Matthias Sutter, 2014. "Car Mechanics in the Lab - Investigating the Behavior of Real Experts on Experimental Markets for Credence Goods," Working Papers 2014-02, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  3. Uwe Dulleck & David Johnston & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2012. "The good, the bad and the naive: Do fair prices signal good types or do they induce good behaviour?," Working Papers 2012-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  4. Marco Castillo & Ragan Petrie & Maximo Torero & Lise Vesterlund, 2011. "Gender Differences in Bar gaining Outcomes: A Field Experiment on Discrimination," Working Papers 1029, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
  5. Mujcic, Redzo & Frijters, Paul, 2013. "Still Not Allowed on the Bus: It Matters If You're Black or White!," IZA Discussion Papers 7300, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. repec:cgr:cgsser:03-07 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Bengtsson, Niklas, 2011. "Regulation Failure and CO2-emissions: An Experimental Investigation of the Cape Town Taxi Market," Working Paper Series, Center for Labor Studies 2011:13, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, revised 12 Aug 2013.
  8. Maarten Janssen & Alexei Parakhonyak, 2011. "Sårvice Refusal in Regulated Markets for Credence Goods," HSE Working papers WP BRP 08/EC/2011, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  9. Alexander Rasch & Christian Waibel, 2013. "What drives fraud in a credence goods market? Evidence from a field study," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 13/179, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:80:y:2013:i:3:p:876-891. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.