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Strategic Institutional Choice: Voters, States, and Congressional Term Limits

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Author Info
Edward J. Lopez (San Jose State University)
R. Todd Jewell (University of North Texas)

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Abstract

This paper demonstrates that states’ decisions on limiting congressional terms are empirically determined by measures of relative political influence in Congress. States’ choices on term limits are quantified as a multiple-categorical variable that reflects variation in the stringency of term limits laws passed. Using 1992 data on the American states, the model controls for unobserved heterogeneity that is introduced by some voters having access to institutions of direct democracy. At 2002 state-level values for congressional tenure and federal spending, the model predicts approximately eight to ten additional states would choose to limit terms of their own congressional delegations, but are prohibited from doing so under a Supreme Court ruling. The results hold implications for institutional federalism and the potential passage of similar political institutions across the states.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0512006.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 02 Dec 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0512006

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 33
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Related research
Keywords: term limits; political institutions; federalism; political economy;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Peter Calcagno & Monica Escaleras, 2007. "Does Stringency of Gubernatorial Term Limits Matter?," Working Papers 2, Department of Economics and Finance, College of Charleston, revised Sep 2007. [Downloadable!]
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