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Better the devil you know? Reelected politicians and policy outcomes under no term limits

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  • Fernando Aragón

    (Simon Fraser University)

  • Ricardo Pique

    (Ryerson University)

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of having a reelected politician on policy outcomes in the absence of term limits. Using a regression discontinuity design and data from Peruvian municipalities, we find that having a reelected mayor does not have sizable effects on policy outcomes. That result seems to be driven by rapid learning-by-doing by new politicians. Differences in performance and policy outcomes are observed only early in the electoral cycle. Our findings weaken arguments against term limits based on loss of institutional or human capital and support existing interpretations of term limit effects as driven mostly by electoral incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Fernando Aragón & Ricardo Pique, 2020. "Better the devil you know? Reelected politicians and policy outcomes under no term limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 1-16, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:182:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00665-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00665-9
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