Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US
AbstractThis paper develops a simple model to analyse how a lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth. We test the predictions of the model on panel data for the US states. In these data, we find robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti-growth policies: higher taxes, lower capital spending, and a reduced likelihood of using rightto- work laws. We also document a strong link between low political competition and low income growth. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 77 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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