Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures
AbstractWe study the effect of electoral incentives on the allocation of public services across legislative districts. We develop a model in which elections encourage legislators to cater to parochial interests and thus aggravate the common pool problem. Using unique data from seven US states, we study how the amount of funding that a legislator channels to his district changes when he faces a term limit. We find that legislators bring less pork to their district when they cannot seek re-election. Consistent with the Law of 1/N, this last term reduction in funding is smaller in states with many legislative districts. (JEL D72, H70)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Economic Policy.
Volume (Year): 4 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Other versions of this item:
- Toke Aidt & Julia Shvets, 2011. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures," CESifo Working Paper Series 3405, CESifo Group Munich.
- Aidt, T.S. & Shvets, J., 2011. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1130, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Per Pettersson-Lidbom, 2004.
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- Brian Knight, 2005. "Estimating the Value of Proposal Power," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1639-1652, December.
- Jon X. Eguia & Antonio Nicolò, 2011. "On the Efficiency of Partial Information in Elections," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 234, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Marroquín Arreola, Juan & Rios Bolívar, Humberto, 2012. "Gasto público, permanencia en el poder y crecimiento económico /Public Spending, Staying Power and Economic Growth," Estudios de Economía Aplicada, Estudios de Economía Aplicada, vol. 30, pages 363 (22 pag, Abril.
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