This article investigates the support of lawyers' groups for the merit plan, a form of selecting and retaining state judges. Although that support is justified on the grounds of improved administration of justice, this analysis links it to the self-interest of lawyers. First, merit plan procedures involve lawyers and bar associations prominently in the selection process. Second, by reducing a judge's susceptibility to political pressure, the procedures increase the amount of litigation in the state. This article finds that merit plan procedures are associated with between eighteen and thirty-two percent more filings in state supreme courts between 1985 and 1994. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 110 (2002) Issue (Month): 1-2 (January) Pages: 79-97 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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