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Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy:Does Judicial Selection Matter?

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Author Info
Timothy Besley
A. Abigail Payne

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Abstract

One of the most striking changes in labor market policy of the past fifty years has comein the form of legislation to limit discrimination in the workplace based on race, gender,disability and age. If such measures are to be effective in ending discrimination, theyneed to be enforced. The latter is dependent on state and federal agencies such as theEqual Employment Opportunities Commission and ultimately the willingness of courts tofind in favor of plaintiffs. Courts also play an important role in the evolution of antidiscriminationpolicy since past decisions create future precedent. This paper askswhether the number of charges filed with government agencies depends on the method bywhich judges are selected. Popularly elected judges should be expected to have more proemployeepreferences (selection) and should move closer to employee preferences(incentives). This should result in fewer anti-discrimination charges being filed in statesthat appoint their judges. In line with this prediction, this paper uses data on the numberof employment discrimination charges filed for the period 1973-2000 and finds that statesthat appoint their judges have fewer anti-discrimination charges being filed.

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Paper provided by Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE in its series STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series with number 04.

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Date of creation: Aug 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cep:stipep:04

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  2. Angrist, J D & Imbens, G W & Krueger, A B, 1999. "Jackknife Instrumental Variables Estimation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(1), pages 57-67, Jan.-Feb.. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Hayes, Beth, 1984. "Unions and Strikes with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 57-83, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
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  5. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2000. "Issue Unbundling via Citizens' Initiatives," NBER Working Papers 8036, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 875-901, December.
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  7. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Christian Pop-Eleches & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Judicial Checks and Balances," NBER Working Papers 9775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Hanssen, F Andrew, 1999. "The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of Litigation: The Election versus Appointment of State Judges," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 205-32, January.
  10. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. David Neumark & Wendy A. Stock, 2001. "The Effects of Race and Sex Discrimination Laws," NBER Working Papers 8215, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Henning Bohn & Robert P. Inman, 1996. "Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from the U.S. States," NBER Working Papers 5533, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Hanssen, F Andrew, 2000. "Independent Courts and Administrative Agencies: An Empirical Analysis of the States," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 534-71, October.
  14. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "Legal Origins," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1193-1229, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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