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Politicians, Bureaucrats and Targeted Redistribution: The Role of Career Concerns

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  • Ruben Enikolopov

    ()
    (New Economic School (Moscow))

Abstract

Stronger career concerns induce appointed bureaucrats to adopt different policies than elected politicians. In particular, bureaucrats are less likely to use targeted redistribution to achieve personal political goals. I use the example of patronage jobs in local governments in the United States to provide empirical support for this claim. I show that the number of full-time public employees is signi?cantly higher in local governments with elected chief executives. This difference increases during election years. In addition, consistent with the notion that career concerns are especially strong for young bureaucrats, I ?nd that the number of full-time public employees increases with the age of appointed chief executives. There is no such relationship in the case of elected chief executives.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0148.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0148

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  1. Besley, Timothy J. & Payne, A. Abigail, 2005. "Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy: Does Judicial Selection Matter?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5211, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  5. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2009. "Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Municipalities," NBER Working Papers 14857, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Alessro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, . "The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives," Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department b96440ba0bfa06ca550ac40aa, Penn Economics Department.
  7. Rogoff, Kenneth & Sibert, Anne, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16, January.
  8. Boycko, Maxim & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1996. "A Theory of Privatisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 309-19, March.
  9. Albert Alesina & Stephan Danninger & Massimo Rostagno, 2001. "Redistribution Through Public Employment: The Case of Italy," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(3), pages 2.
  10. Hanssen, F Andrew, 1999. "The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of Litigation: The Election versus Appointment of State Judges," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 205-32, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Ruben Enikolopov, 2011. "Are Bureaucrats Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," Working Papers w0165, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  2. Mark Partridge & Tim Sass, 2011. "The productivity of elected and appointed officials: the case of school superintendents," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 149(1), pages 133-149, October.

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