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Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary

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Author Info
Lars Feld ()
Stefan Voigt

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Abstract

It is argued that an independent judiciary is a necessary condition for both individual liberty and economic prosperity. After having surveyed the literature dealing with how to arrange for an independent judiciary, the authors derive some additional policy implications by drawing on two indicators of judicial independence (JI) recently introduced by them. De facto JI has a robust and highly significant impact on economic growth. Individual components of both de jure and de facto JI on economic growth are estimated for their impact on economic growth. Additionally, the effects of other institutional arrangements such as presidential vs. parliamentary systems are inquired into.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 1260.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1260

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Related research
Keywords: judicial independence; constitutional design; positive constitutional economics; economic growth;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-79, April.
    Other versions:
  2. Toma, Eugenia Froedge, 1991. "Congressional Influence and the Supreme Court: The Budget as a Signaling Device," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 131-46, January.
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    Other versions:
  7. Moe, Terry M, 1990. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(0), pages 213-53.
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  9. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Christian Pop-Eleches & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Judicial Checks and Balances," NBER Working Papers 9775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Brennan, Geoffrey & Kliemt, Hartmut, 1994. "Finite Lives and Social Institutions," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(4), pages 551-71.
  11. Ramseyer, J Mark & Rasmusen, Eric B, 2001. "Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 53-88, January.
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  12. Ferejohn, John A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1992. "A positive theory of statutory interpretation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 263-279, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Feld, Lars P. & Voigt, Stefan, 2003. "Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 497-527, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Tim Besley & Abigail Payne, 2003. "Judicial accountability and economic policy outcomes: evidence from employment discrimination charges," IFS Working Papers W03/11, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
  20. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "The Relevance of Judicial Procedure for Economic Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Francisco Ramos, 2006. "The Establishment of Constitutional Courts: A Study of 128 Democratic Constitutions," Review of Law & Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1). [Downloadable!]
  3. Stefan Voigt & Lorenz Blume, . "Wenn Justitia die Hand aufhält – Ursachen und Folgen korrupter Justizbehörden," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2005-1-1133, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Stefan Voigt, 2005. "The Economic Effects of Judicial Accountability - Some Preliminary Insights," Discussion Papers in Economics 72/05, University of Kassel, Institute of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Stefan Voigt, 2009. "Does Arbitration Blossom when State Courts are Bad?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200906, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
  6. Bernd Hayo and Stefan Voigt, 2005. "Explaining de facto Judicial Independence," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200507, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Stefan Voigt, 2008. "The (Economic) Effects of Lay Participation in Courts – A Cross-Country Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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