Legal Origins and the Evolution of Institutions: Evidence from American State Courts
AbstractSeveral important studies of institutions assume that the quality of institutions is persistent following some formative historic event. The assumption of institutional persistence, however, begs the question of how these institutions persisted. To better understand this issue, this paper examines the evolution of state courts in the United States. We begin by reviewing the evidence that France, Spain, and Mexico operated civil-law legal systems in territory that would later make up thirteen states. One important philosophical difference between civil-law and common-law legal systems arises from differences in their beliefs regarding the appropriate degree of judicial independence. To show how these beliefs, if persistent, would manifest themselves, we present a model in which legislatures allocate budgets to their judges. In the model, common and civil-law legislatures have different preferences regarding the level of judicial independence. Our model predicts civil-law legislatures will give fewer discretionary resources to their judges when judicial elections are replaced by a system of appointments. We confirm this prediction using state-level data for the period 1961-1999. Finally, we argue that one important reason why civil-law preferences for a weak judiciary appear to have persisted in the American states is that the political culture within state legislatures is slow-moving.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 320.
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision: Jun 2007
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-07-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-07-07 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-HIS-2007-07-07 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-PKE-2007-07-07 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-POL-2007-07-07 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Andrei Shleifer & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Rafael La Porta, 2008.
"The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 285-332, June.
- Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & La Porta, Rafael, 2008. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," Scholarly Articles 2962610, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2007. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," NBER Working Papers 13608, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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