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Explaining de facto Judicial Independence

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  • Bernd Hayo and Stefan Voigt

    ()
    (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps Universitaet Marburg)

Abstract

A high degree of de facto judicial Independence (JI) functions as a crucial precondition of governments to credibly commit to legislative decisions, such as respecting private property rights. Thus, de facto JI should improve the allocative efficiency and may therefore contribute positively to economic growth. But JI as formally written down in legal texts is an imperfect predictor for de facto JI. This paper tries to identify the forces which determine de facto JI. A distinction between factors that can be influenced in the short run and those that are the result of historical development and that are exempt from short-term modification is made. Ascertaining the relative relevance of these two groups of variables promises to be policy-relevant. A rigorous empirical model reduction process is used in order to cope with the potential excess of explanatory variables. The explanatory variables for de facto JI that survive the reduction process are de jure JI, legal confidence of the public, extent of democratization, degree of press freedom, and the religious beliefs of the population.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series Marburg Working Papers on Economics with number 200507.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in
Handle: RePEc:mar:volksw:200507

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Keywords: Judicial independence; informal institutions; formal institutions;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2005. "Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System," ICER Working Papers 02-2005, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  2. Fabio Padovano, 2009. "The time-varying independence of Italian peak judicial institutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 230-250, September.
  3. Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2012. "Explaining Constitutional Change: The Case of Judicial Independence," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201249, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  4. Jaroslaw Kantorowicz, 2014. "Judges as Fiscal Activists: Can Constitutional Review Shape Public Finance?," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 2, pages 79-104, June.
  5. Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "The Relevance of Judicial Procedure for Economic Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 2514, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Padovano, Fabio & Fiorino, Nadia, 2012. "Strategic delegation and “judicial couples” in the Italian Constitutional Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 215-223.
  7. Arusha Cooray, 2012. "Suffrage, Democracy and Gender Equality in Education," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(1), pages 21-47, June.
  8. George Tridimas, 2010. "Constitutional judicial review and political insurance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 81-101, February.
  9. Papageorgiadis, Nikolaos & Cross, Adam R. & Alexiou, Constantinos, 2013. "The impact of the institution of patent protection and enforcement on entry mode strategy: A panel data investigation of U.S. firms," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 278-292.
  10. Stefan Voigt, 2009. "Positive Constitutional Economics II—A Survey of Recent Developments," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200936, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

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