IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/pbudge/v37y2017i3p24-46.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Judicial Independence and US State Bond Ratings: An Empirical Investigation

Author

Listed:
  • John A. Dove

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • John A. Dove, 2017. "Judicial Independence and US State Bond Ratings: An Empirical Investigation," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 24-46, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:pbudge:v:37:y:2017:i:3:p:24-46
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/pbaf.12153
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sussman, Nathan & Yafeh, Yishay, 2000. "Institutions, Reforms, and Country Risk: Lessons from Japanese Government Debt in the Meiji Era," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(02), pages 442-467, June.
    2. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37.
    3. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 169-179, March.
    4. Kiewiet, D Roderick & Szakaly, Kristin, 1996. "Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 62-97, April.
    5. Troilo, Michael, 2011. "Legal institutions and high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 158-175, June.
    6. Mark Schelker, 2012. "The influence of auditor term length and term limits on US state general obligation bond ratings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 27-49, January.
    7. Baumol, William J., 1996. "Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, and destructive," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 3-22, January.
    8. Peter T. Calcagno & Justin D. Benefield, 2013. "Economic freedom, the cost of public borrowing, and state bond ratings," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 5(1), pages 72-85, February.
    9. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-1150, July.
    10. Kristina Nyström, 2008. "The institutions of economic freedom and entrepreneurship: evidence from panel data," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 269-282, September.
    11. Bayoumi, Tamim & Goldstein, Morris & Woglom, Geoffrey, 1995. "Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from the U.S. States," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 1046-1059, November.
    12. Tim Besley & Abigail Payne, 2003. "Judicial accountability and economic policy outcomes: evidence from employment discrimination charges," IFS Working Papers W03/11, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    13. F. Andrew Hanssen, 2004. "Learning about Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the State Courts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 431-473, June.
    14. Tabarrok, Alexander & Helland, Eric, 1999. "Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 157-188, April.
    15. Luc Laeven & Christopher Woodruff, 2007. "The Quality of the Legal System, Firm Ownership, and Firm Size," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(4), pages 601-614, November.
    16. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    17. Elder, Harold W., 1987. "Property rights structures and criminal courts: An analysis of state criminal courts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 21-32, June.
    18. Silvia Ardagna & Annamaria Lusardi, 2010. "Heterogeneity in the Effect of Regulation on Entrepreneurship and Entry Size," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 594-605, 04-05.
    19. Schultz, Kenneth A. & Weingast, Barry R., 2003. "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(1), pages 3-42, January.
    20. Feld, Lars P. & Voigt, Stefan, 2003. "Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 497-527, September.
    21. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2002. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1231-1294.
    22. North, Douglass C, 1994. "Economic Performance through Time," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 359-368, June.
    23. Joan-Lluis Capelleras & Kevin F Mole & Francis J Greene & David J Storey, 2008. "Do more heavily regulated economies have poorer performing new ventures? Evidence from Britain and Spain," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 39(4), pages 688-704, June.
    24. Ariel R. Belasen & Rik W. Hafer & Shrikant P. Jategaonkar, 2015. "Economic Freedom And State Bond Ratings," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(4), pages 668-677, October.
    25. Jonathan Levie & Erkko Autio, 2011. "Regulatory Burden, Rule of Law, and Entry of Strategic Entrepreneurs: An International Panel Study," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48, pages 1392-1419, September.
    26. Ruta Aidis & Saul Estrin & Tomasz Mickiewicz, 2012. "Size matters: entrepreneurial entry and government," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 119-139, July.
    27. Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, 2006. "The Effect of Judicial Independence on Courts: Evidence from the American States," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 399-440, June.
    28. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
    29. Eichengreen, B., 1992. "Should the Maastricht Treaty be Saved?," Princeton Studies in International Economics 74, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
    30. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2005. "Unbundling Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 949-995, October.
    31. Liu, Pu & Thakor, Anjan V, 1984. "Interest Yields, Credit Ratings, and Economic Characteristics of State Bonds: An Empirical Analysis: A Note," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(3), pages 344-351, August.
    32. Peter T. Calcagno & Justin D. Benefield, 2013. "Economic freedom, the cost of public borrowing, and state bond ratings," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 5(1), pages 72-85, April.
    33. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
    34. Dove, John A., 2015. "The effect of judicial independence on entrepreneurship in the US states," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 72-96.
    35. Adriana Cordis, 2009. "Judicial checks on corruption in the United States," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 375-401, November.
    36. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    37. James M. Poterba & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number pote99-1, May.
    38. Craig Depken & Courtney Lafountain, 2006. "Fiscal consequences of public corruption: Empirical evidence from state bond ratings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 75-85, January.
    39. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 903-937, October.
    40. Robert C. Lowry, 2001. "A Visible Hand? Bond Markets, Political Parties, Balanced Budget Laws, and State Government Debt," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 49-72, March.
    41. Dincecco, Mark, 2009. "Political regimes and sovereign credit risk in Europe, 1750–1913," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 31-63, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. John Dove & William J. Byrd, 2022. "Judicial independence and lynching in historical context: an analysis of US States," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), vol. 16(3), pages 639-672, September.
    2. Gary A. Wagner & Jamie Bologna Pavlik, 2020. "Patent intensity and concentration: The effect of institutional quality on MSA patent activity," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(4), pages 857-898, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dove, John A., 2015. "The effect of judicial independence on entrepreneurship in the US states," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 72-96.
    2. John A. Dove, 2023. "One size fits all? The differential impact of federal regulation on early-stage entrepreneurial activity across US states," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 57-73, April.
    3. John Dove & William J. Byrd, 2022. "Judicial independence and lynching in historical context: an analysis of US States," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), vol. 16(3), pages 639-672, September.
    4. Dove, John A., 2018. "It's easier to contract than to pay: Judicial independence and US municipal default in the 19th century," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 1062-1081.
    5. Du, Julan & Lu, Yi & Tao, Zhigang, 2012. "Contracting institutions and vertical integration: Evidence from China’s manufacturing firms," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 89-107.
    6. Troilo, Michael, 2011. "Legal institutions and high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 158-175, June.
    7. John A. Dove & Courtney A. Collins & Daniel J. Smith, 2018. "The impact of public pension board of trustee composition on state bond ratings," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 51-73, February.
    8. Andrea Asoni, 2008. "Protection Of Property Rights And Growth As Political Equilibria," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 953-987, December.
    9. Troilo, Michael & Walkup, Brian R. & Abe, Masato & Lee, Seulki, 2019. "Legal systems and the financing of working capital," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 641-656.
    10. Saul Estrin & Tomasz Mickiewicz & Anna Rebmann, 2017. "Prospect theory and the effects of bankruptcy laws on entrepreneurial aspirations," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 48(4), pages 977-997, April.
    11. Beck, T.H.L., 2010. "Legal Institutions and Economic Development," Other publications TiSEM 8aa07b48-ce55-4cf6-8754-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. Yasar, Mahmut & Paul, Catherine J. Morrison & Ward, Michael R., 2011. "Property Rights Institutions and Firm Performance: A Cross-Country Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 648-661, April.
    13. Lu, Yi & Tao, Zhigang, 2009. "Contract enforcement and family control of business: Evidence from China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 597-609, December.
    14. Mendoza, Ronald U. & Canare, Tristan A. & Ang, Alvin, 2015. "Doing Business: A Review of Literature and Its Role in APEC 2015," Research Paper Series DP 2015-37, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
    15. Jamie Bologna Pavlik & Andrew T. Young, 2020. "Medieval European traditions in representation and state capacity today," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 133-186, June.
    16. Haggard, Stephan & Tiede, Lydia, 2011. "The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 673-685, May.
    17. Ang, Alvin & Mendoza, Ronald U. & Canare, Tristan A., 2015. "Doing Business: A Review of Literature and Its Role in APEC 2015," Discussion Papers DP 2015-37, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
    18. Lu, Yi & Png, Ivan P.L. & Tao, Zhigang, 2013. "Do institutions not matter in China? Evidence from manufacturing enterprises," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 74-90.
    19. Skip Krueger & Robert W. Walker, 2008. "Divided Government, Political Turnover, and State Bond Ratings," Public Finance Review, , vol. 36(3), pages 259-286, May.
    20. Dove, 2016. "Judicial independence and economic freedom in the US states," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 78-83, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:pbudge:v:37:y:2017:i:3:p:24-46. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0275-1100 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.