Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from the U.S. States
Abstract
The degree to which credit markets discipline sovereign borrowers is investigated by estimating the supply curve for debt faced by U.S. states. The results generally support an optimistic view of the market discipline hypothesis, with credit markets providing incentives for sovereign borrowers to restrain borrowing. While the risk premium on bond yields is estimated to increase only gradually at low levels of debt, this effect appears to become much larger as debt rises. There is also some evidence that credit markets may withhold access to credit at very high levels of debt. Copyright 1995 by Ohio State University Press.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
Volume (Year): 27 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 1046-59
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879
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