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Judicial independence and lynching in historical context: an analysis of US States

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Listed:
  • John Dove

    (Troy University)

  • William J. Byrd

    (Troy University)

Abstract

An independent judiciary is a centrally important economic institution, and one that facilitates and promotes the protection of property rights, thereby fostering economic growth and development. On the other hand, extrajudicial lynchings, at least in the context of US states, have been tied to a lack of property rights and their protection (Carden in Institutions and southern development: lynching as a signal of insecure property rights. Ph.D. Dissertation. Washington University, 2006). However, these two areas of research have not been simultaneously explored. This study rectifies that by evaluating how a relatively independent judiciary might affect lynching rates across US states between 1883 and 1930. Overall, the results suggest that a relatively more independent judiciary (as measured through the method of selection and term length) is associated with a lower likelihood of observing a lynching in a given jurisdiction. This is true for both state courts of last resort and state courts of general jurisdiction.

Suggested Citation

  • John Dove & William J. Byrd, 2022. "Judicial independence and lynching in historical context: an analysis of US States," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), vol. 16(3), pages 639-672, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:cliomt:v:16:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s11698-021-00238-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s11698-021-00238-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Judicial independence; Lynch; Mob violence; Property rights; Development;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • N42 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-

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