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The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth Century England

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  • Daniel M. Klerman
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    Abstract

    This article assesses the impact of changes in judicial independence on equity markets. North and Weingast (1989) argue that judicial independence and other institutional changes inaugurated by the Glorious Revolution of 1688--89 improved public and private finance in England by putting restraints on the government. We calculate abnormal equity returns at critical points in the passage of statutes giving judges greater security of tenure and higher salaries. Early-eighteenth-century legislation granting tenure during good behavior is associated with large and statistically significant positive abnormal returns. Other statutes had positive but generally insignificant effects. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/aler/ahi005
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal American Law and Economics Review.

    Volume (Year): 7 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 1-27

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    Handle: RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:7:y:2005:i:1:p:1-27

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    Cited by:
    1. Ross Levine, 2005. "Law, Endowments, and Property Rights," NBER Working Papers 11502, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski, 2013. "Elected vs appointed public law enforcers," Working Papers 2013-06, CRESE.
    3. Stephen Quinn, 2008. "Securitization of Sovereign Debt: Corporations as a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism in Britain, 1694-1750," Working Papers 200701, Texas Christian University, Department of Economics.
    4. Hadfield, Gillian K., 2008. "The levers of legal design: Institutional determinants of the quality of law," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 43-73, March.

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