Elected vs appointed public law enforcers
AbstractThis paper revisits the issue of law enforcement and the design of monetary sanctions when the public law enforcer's incentives depart from those of a benevolent authority, which is the most frequent assumption made in the literature on crime deterrence. We first consider the case an elected enforcer. We find that when the harm generated by offenses is quite small relative to the average private benefits, equilibrium with weak enforcement/low sanction prevails. Instead, when the harm generated by offenses is high relative to the average private benefits, it is the equilibrium with strong enforcement/high sanctions that prevails. Therefore, we provide an explanation for the empirical puzzle highlighted by Lin(2007): elected enforcers punish major (minor) crimes more (less) severely than the benevolent social planer. The case of an appointed enforcer prone to rent seeking is also considered. The monetary sanction under rent seeking is closer to the utilitarian level, as compared with the one under election.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CRESE in its series Working Papers with number 2013-06.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2013
Date of revision:
law enforcement; deterrence; monetary sanctions; punishment; electoral competition; democracy; rent seeking; dictature.;
Other versions of this item:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-09-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-09-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2013-09-13 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2013-09-13 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAW-2013-09-13 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2013-09-13 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2013-09-13 (Positive Political Economics)
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