Is there an electoral-motivated crime rate cycle? Evidence from Argentina
AbstractIn the last three decades Argentina tripled its crime rate boosting safety at the top of mayor concerns of Argentineans which leaves open the question about the behavior of incumbent governors of the 23 provinces about anti-crime measures in the proximity of elections. How do incumbent governors react to escalating crime as elections come closer? This paper investigates electorally-motivated crime rate fluctuations in Argentina for the period 1984-2007. District–level dynamic panel data reveals the existence of an electoral cycle in the total crime rate as well as in property crimes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 40177.
Date of creation: 19 Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Crime; Electoral cycles; Dynamic Panel Data; Argentina;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2012-07-29 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-POL-2012-07-29 (Positive Political Economics)
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