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Can judiciaries constrain executive power? Evidence from judicial reforms

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  • Chemin, Matthieu

Abstract

An accessible, swift and unbiased legal system may constrain the executive by limiting expropriation and the misuse of public office for private gain. I test this hypothesis by assembling a database of judicial reforms supported by foreign aid. To address the endogenous placement of these reforms, I implement a within-country identification strategy comparing groups more or less connected to the executive. I find that judicial reforms disproportionately benefit the powerless and discriminated groups of society. Their perception that the president will never ignore the courts and laws is lower at baseline by 11 percentage points compared to other more connected groups in society, and it differentially increases by 10 percentage points after a judicial reform, nearly closing the gap between groups.

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  • Chemin, Matthieu, 2021. "Can judiciaries constrain executive power? Evidence from judicial reforms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:199:y:2021:i:c:s0047272721000645
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104428
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